

Ryo-to Ja-bi

The Dragon-head and Snake-tail campaign¹

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On April 13th 1592, Yukinaga Konishi landed in Fusan (Pusan) South Korea marking the first major invasion attempted by the samurai class.² For centuries the samurai class had warred among themselves the only significant foreign force they had ever encountered was the Mongols in 1274 and 1281. What motivated the Japanese to finally venture from their island homes and why was their first military foray to Asia proper ultimately unsuccessful?

After consolidating Japan under his control, Hideyoshi was unable to enjoy the peace and prosperity he had created. The vast armies assembled during the Warring States period also had trouble adjusting to peaceful civilian life. Encouraged by the auspicious omens of his birth and his unprecedented rise, Hideyoshi became convinced that it was his destiny to forge a vast Asiatic empire. Such was his confidence, Hideyoshi made elaborate post victory plans shortly after the invasion began. Whether his confidence fueled his vanity or his vanity fueled his confidence I'm not sure. Indeed some are convinced he was more interested in personal fame than in military domination.³ Some suggested the Europeans he had encountered could have provided an impetus for Hideyoshi to look abroad noting "he wished to add dominions to the Empire, to extend his power beyond the seas after the manner of the Kings of Spain."⁴

Prior to and during the invasion of Korea a lengthy period of formal correspondence between Japan and the other countries in Asia took place. Hideyoshi desired both diplomatic relations and trade mostly of a tributary nature with his neighboring states. Envoys were sent to the Ryukyus, Manila, the Viceroy of the Indies, and Taiwan as well as Korea.⁵ The tone of Hideyoshi's formal letters to the various kings were similar, he recounted his past triumphs, stressed the benevolence of his rule, but also implied

¹ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 173.

² Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 146.

³ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 216.

⁴ F. Hadland Davis, Japan: From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of the Tsintau (London, T.C. & E.C. Jack Ltd., 1916), 180.

⁵ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 212.

the threat of military action. Another common request expressed in the letters was Hideyoshi's desire to have his own name known far and wide. His last letter to the Korean king stated "My wish is nothing other than that my name be known throughout the three countries [of Japan, China, and India]."⁶ It is from these official letters as well as from among Hideyoshi's private letters that one is able to gain insight into the processes leading up to the invasion as well as the failed peace negotiations that would be attempted later on.

Hideyoshi is fond of recounting the story of his destiny to rule in his formal and private letters. Since it is his own confidence of a quick, decisive victory and his vanity that leads to the invasion of Korea, I wanted to present the story in Hideyoshi's own words as addressed to the King of Korea.

Although I was born to a family of low rank, my mother conceived me immediately after she had dreamed the Sun had entered into her bosom. A physiognomist interpreted this dream and predicted that I was destined to extend my authority to all parts of the world wherever the sun shines. When I came to manhood, my benevolent rule would be admired by nations in every direction. People within the four seas would all come under my influence and power. Because I was born with so great a destiny, which was revealed by this omen, those who have fostered feelings of enmity and opposition have been crushed and destroyed.⁷

The threat of opposition to Hideyoshi's benevolent rule is elaborated further in the complete letter. It is unprecedented that someone of such humble beginnings would rise so high in Japanese society and his pridefulness is perhaps a result of this stratospheric rise. One of his biographers noted that his vision, will to succeed, and desire to act sometimes seemed to be shrewdness and other times it came across as megalomania.⁸

As noted previously, trade is often stressed in Hideyoshi's letters to foreign leaders. Berry believes the war against Korea and China was partly to force them into direct trading relations with Japan. She sites Hideyoshi's control of ports, the initiation of the red-seal ship system, and his emphasis on trade

⁶ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi, 208.

⁷ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 302.

⁸ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 215.

in the eventual peace proposals as evidence to support this theory.⁹ She also notes that it was partially due to Hideyoshi's success, through intimidation, of encouraging trade among the Pacific Nations that gave him the confidence to attempt the unprecedented invasion of Korea.¹⁰

Although Hideyoshi tried to negotiate with Korea for about a decade, chiefly through the So clan of Tsushima, he was unable to secure the terms he wanted. Hideyoshi desired Korea to submit to Japan as a tributary state and for Korea to aid Japan in his planned invasion of China. He was able to convince the Koreans to eventually send an envoy to Japan after Hideyoshi agreed to return 160 Korean sailors to Korea to face charges of piracy. The Korean ambassadors arrived in Jurakutei in 1590.¹¹ These diplomatic relations were broken off as Hideyoshi held firm to his stated goal of invading China. The Koreans thought "this demand was most unexpected. We cannot even understand how you dared to plan such an undertaking and to make such a request of us..."¹²

Although they refused to aid Japan in Hideyoshi's attempt to "invade the supreme nation [China]"¹³ The Korean's did not take the threat of Japanese invasion seriously, believing it to be a bluff.¹⁴ Korean historian Ki-baik Lee stated that after Korea began to suffer pirate attacks from the Japanese, prior to the first invasion, the government created the Border Defense Council (*Pibyonsa*) jointly staffed by civil and military officials. The bureaucrats used to centuries of peace did not take anything more than temporary measures to prepare for the Japanese threat.¹⁵

Having lost faith in the diplomatic process in the seventh month of 1591 Hideyoshi ordered preparations for an invasion of Korea, two months later daimyos began amassing troops.¹⁶ A fortress was constructed in Nagoya from here the invasion would be coordinated. "The army raised by Hideyoshi for this continental campaign was the greatest and strongest, both numerically and in fighting strength, ever

⁹ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi, 212.

¹⁰ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi, 213.

¹¹ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi, 208.

¹² Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 303-4.

¹³ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 303.

¹⁴ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China Volume 8 The Ming Dynasty, 1368-144, Part 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 293.

¹⁵ Ki-baik Lee, A new history of Korea (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 209-210.

¹⁶ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 208.

mustered in Japan up to this time, but his naval force consisted of only 9200 men.”¹⁷ With such a powerful force, fighting such an unprepared foe, Hideyoshi’s envisioned quick victory did seem likely.

Yet after seven years of war abroad the Japanese were unable to completely subdue Korea or achieve their stated goal of marching on Peking. The contributing factors included: Hideyoshi’s decision to stay in Japan, indecision amongst his daimyos, the Japanese inexperience fighting abroad, the unexpected difficulties in supplying the troops, and the eventual tenacity of the Chinese and Korean defense of their homes. Kuno believed that the “death of his mother greatly affected Hideyoshi’s continental plans.”¹⁸

The initial Korean reaction was foreseeable “with no recent experience in warfare, unequipped with firearms, and lacking a reliable conscription system, the Koreans were powerless before their war seasoned neighbors.”¹⁹ On April 17th the Korean capitol learned of the invasion, after the army they sent out was annihilated the Korean king abandoned his capitol and fled to the North.²⁰ “The populace at large was infuriated at the government’s incompetence and irresponsibility.”²¹ In Seoul the city’s slave population set fire to the registry office where the slave rosters were kept and to the office of the Ministry of Punishments.²² Thus when the Japanese reached Seoul on May 2nd it was undefended, abandoned by the ruling class, and had already been burned and looted by the Koreans.²³ The Japanese remained in Seoul as Hideyoshi’s original plan was to join his armies there.

The almost unopposed march up the Korean peninsula, exactly as Hideyoshi envisioned, likely contributed to Hideyoshi making his elaborate post victory plans at this juncture. These plans, revealed in various letters, included how to divide up his now larger empire. He planned to move the Japanese emperor to the Ming capitol, and select new reagents for Japan and Korea. He considered who would be

¹⁷ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 145.

¹⁸ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 149.

¹⁹ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 209.

²⁰ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 146-7.

²¹ Ki-baik Lee, A new history of Korea (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 210.

²² Ki-baik Lee, A new history of Korea, 210.

²³ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 147.

enthroned as the next emperor of Japan. Hideyoshi also laid out an elaborate travel route that the emperor would take from Japan through Korea and on to Peiking.²⁴

Hideyoshi's own arrival in Korea was supposed to be imminent, once Seoul was secured, but numerous factors prevented him from joining his troops as he had done in all his previous military campaigns. Ieyasu and Toshiie who had remained in Japan, tried to persuade Hideyoshi to stay, stating his presence was vital to maintaining national peace and unity. They also cited the weather, warning that a large flotilla crossing at this time could meet with a similar fate to that of the Mongols.²⁵ Hideyoshi's mother and the emperor Goyozei both tried to convince Hideyoshi to at least delay his departure until March when the weather would be better.²⁶ Other scholars cite his advancing age and ill health as reasons for Hideyoshi not commanding his armies personally.²⁷ It was during this period of indecision that the joint Korean/Chinese counter offensive began, which likely further influenced Hideyoshi's decision to remain in Japan.

Without Hideyoshi's strong willed presence the daimyo's in Korea frequently disagreed with each other and did not operate as a cohesive force. Ukita Hideie was field marshal of the first expedition but was replaced by Kohayakawa Hideaki for the second expedition.²⁸ Not all Hideyoshi's vassals supported the invasion, notably Tokugawa and Maeda, thus the support they gave was reduced. In addition, they constantly counseled against committing further resources to the war. The daimyo that were enthusiastic about the campaign and provided the most manpower were mostly from Western Japan.

"Though troops fought well under separate generals, the armies sent did not support each other and their movements were not subordinated to any fixed plan of campaign."²⁹ Walter Denning further noted the Generals were often jealous of each other, victories were often not followed up upon, and the Japanese lacked co-ordination between their land and sea forces.³⁰ Although the Japanese had developed effective military tactics after centuries of warring amongst themselves, they were inexperienced in sea

²⁴ Mary E. Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 211.

²⁵ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 149.

²⁶ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 149-150.

²⁷ F. Hadland Davis, Japan: From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of the Tsintau (London, T.C. & E.C. Jack Ltd., 1916), 184.

²⁸ Walter Denning, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (New York, AMS Press, 1930), 252-253.

²⁹ Walter Denning, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 250.

³⁰ Walter Denning, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 250.

warfare, which was crucial to the success of the Korean campaign. Hideyoshi's failure to support his troops with a large effective navy was one of the key weaknesses of the first invasion.

Initially the Japanese navy, which consisted of mostly troop transports with few actual warships, had as easy of time, as the soldiers on land. The Korean navy having heard of the savagery of the Japanese when battling on land assumed they would fight with the same tenacity at sea. Thus the Korean naval commander rather than engage the Japanese ships he encountered chose instead to sink his own fleet and escape in smaller boats to land. This resulted in the promotion of a new Korean naval commander Yi Shun-Chen, who would have a devastating effect on the Japanese navy and on the campaign as a whole.³¹

Yi defeated the Japanese fleet at Okp'o, Tangp'o, Tanghangp'o, Hasan Island, and Pusan. Besides providing more daring leadership to the Korean navy, Yi also developed an entirely new class of ship, the *Kobukson* or "turtle ships".³² Historians of numerous nationalities cite Yi and the fearsome turtle ships as keys to turning the naval war in favor of the Koreans. After their defeat at Hasan Island, Japan was forced to abandon its plans to supply its troops by sea.

The turtle ships were oar-driven with a metal roof for protection from incendiary arrows and other projectiles. They were larger than most Japanese warships, which in many cases were not even naval vessels. The turtle ships were armed with cannon on all sides allowing them to engage the enemy from multiple approach angles. Although heavily armed and armored the turtle ships were still faster and more maneuverable than the Japanese ships.³³

Fearing Yi and the turtle ships the Japanese fleet remained in harbor at Fusan (Pusan). Yi even attempted to destroy the fleet in harbor on September 1st, 1592. Although fighting both the entire navy and a substantial army regiment Yi destroyed one hundred war vessels before being forced to withdraw with heavy casualties.³⁴ This battle basically was the last naval encounter of the first invasion as both fleets

³¹ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 153.

³² Ki-baik Lee, A new history of Korea (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 212.

³³ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China Volume 8 The Ming Dynasty, 1368-144, Part 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 295.

³⁴ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 154-155.

were decimated, the Japanese were able to communicate between Nagoya and Korea but they could now offer their land forces no naval support.

The Japanese inexperience fighting abroad was amply demonstrated in the difficulties they had in supplying their troops. As noted above their failure to provide a substantial navy meant the coastline of Korea was unsafe for supply ships. On land the Japanese generally defeated all organized armies that marched against them, but the guerrilla warfare tactics employed by the Koreans caused their advance to slow as their supply and communication lines lengthened. The Japanese were also ill prepared for the harshness of the winters in Northern Korea, as the majority of their forces were used to warmer climates.³⁵

To supply their armies abroad the Japanese “spent 30 million yen in the purchase of food alone.”³⁶ The Japanese didn’t mind if Korean forces captured their rice supply as it was such an incredibly vast quantity of rice that it would be difficult to transport or consume it. Indeed the Japanese actually hoped the Koreans would take the rice inland to save them the trouble of doing it themselves, being confident they could recapture it as they marched.³⁷ Mr. Denning reports that this scenario occurred just as the Japanese had planned but I can’t help but wonder why the Japanese would risk their food supply in this manner, even granted that it could not be consumed or transported away without a major expenditure of manpower. What about the destruction or poisoning of the food supply a tactic not unknown in the annals of military history?

Due to the length of the war, much of Korea’s land went uncultivated resulting in widespread famine by March of 1593 when the peace process began in earnest. The Japanese in the later stages of the first campaign began cultivating the land around the areas under their control to supplement their own dwindling food supplies.³⁸ Japanese forces pushed as far North as P’yong-yang (Pyeng Yang) and the Yalu river where they were finally halted due to ineffective supply and communication lines as well as the committal of Chinese troops to the conflict.

The Korean king made repeated appeals to the Ming throne as he retreated further and further North, hoping to secure aid before his country was completely overrun. Indeed such was the speed at

³⁵ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 165.

³⁶ Walter Denning, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (New York, AMS Press, 1930), 250.

³⁷ Walter Denning, The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 251.

³⁸ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 164-166.

which the Japanese advanced in the early stages of the war, that the Chinese doubted they could be advancing so rapidly without Korean collusion.³⁹ But with the fall of P'yong-yang the Japanese invasion became a matter of Chinese national security. Although the Ming emperor promised an army of over 100,000 to rid Korea of all Japanese and even planned to pursue a counter invasion of Japan. Due to a Northern border war with Mongolia the Chinese were only able to initially send 35,000 troops under Sung Ying-Chang.⁴⁰

Yukinaga commander of the forces occupying Pyeng Yang and Shen Wei-Chiang who was appointed by the Chinese emperor to pursue a peaceful end to the invasion, negotiated a tentative peace agreement and a cease fire. While Shen was journeying back to the Chinese capitol he was captured by the latest Chinese army sent to quell the Japanese invasion. The general Li Ju-Sung who had succeeded in ending the Northern border war was angered that Shen should sue for peace so early, he wanted to executed Shen but was persuaded to keep him prisoner instead. So while Yukinaga was expecting the return of a peace envoy, the Chinese army attacked on January 6th 1593.⁴¹ After three days of intense fighting Yukinaga and his army retreated towards the Korean capitol. This was the first substantial defeat on land of the Japanese forces.

The Japanese retreated all their forces to the Korean capitol. Finding all the Japanese fortresses abandoned on their march to Seoul, gave the Chinese great confidence. The sixth Japanese division under Takakage met the Chinese at Piti Kuan defeating them and almost killing Li Ju-Sung. Li now decided that China could not defeat the Japanese in Korea let alone attack Japan and was forced to rely on his prisoner Shen Wei-Chiang, as he now considered a peace treaty the best option.⁴²

The peace process lasted around three years and was principally conducted by lower ranking officials who deceived each other and who co-operated in deceiving their own governments.⁴³ Before withdrawing his forces Hideyoshi desired to demonstrate his power one last time, ordering the attack on the

³⁹ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China Volume 8 The Ming Dynasty, 1368-144, Part 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 295.

⁴⁰ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 157-158.

⁴¹ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 160-162.

⁴² Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 163-164.

⁴³ Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 167.

fortress at Chin-Chou where over 60,000 Koreans were killed.⁴⁴ In September of 1596 the Ming envoys formally returned to Japan presenting Hideyoshi with two documents. A priest translated the letters dictating the Chinese terms of peace, he “was too honest to give anything but a literal rendering.”⁴⁵ Following the final proposed terms of peace, Hideyoshi felt insulted and raised 140,000 men to resume a full-scale offensive in 1597.⁴⁶

The second campaign differed from the first in a number of ways. First the Japanese were now fighting on slightly more familiar land, during the first campaign they were generally ignorant of continental geography. Second they provided much more substantial naval support for this invasion. Third the Japanese advanced much slower building forts as they went. However “the second invasion was neither a continental nor a Chinese campaign, but simply a Korean campaign.”⁴⁷ Even before Hideyoshi’s death the Japanese troops began to return home, but the Japanese finally withdrew completely before Ieyasu secured control of Japan.

Historians disagree drastically over the success of the second invasion. Hideyoshi’s personally commissioned biography, the *Tensho-ki* concludes with the year 1592, avoiding the topic entirely.⁴⁸ Another biographer, Berry believes Hideyoshi achieved his goals with the second invasion. He displayed the firmness of his will, showed his army could challenge China and took a gruesome toll in Korean casualties for a slight to his honor.⁴⁹ A second biographer recounted that Hideyoshi considered “These expeditions the one great mistake of his life.”⁵⁰ Some “historians are agreed that toward the close of the war both China and Korea were militarily and financially exhausted and that they had no fighting chance against the Japanese.”⁵¹ Korean historians seemed to think the second invasions was much less successful on land but conceded that the Japanese navy performed much better.⁵²

⁴⁴ Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent*, 168.

⁴⁵ F. Hadland Davis, *Japan: From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of the Tsintau* (London, T.C. & E.C. Jack Ltd., 1916), 187.

⁴⁶ Mary E. Berry, *Hideyoshi* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 232-233.

⁴⁷ Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 171.

⁴⁸ Mary E. Berry, *Hideyoshi* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982), 222.

⁴⁹ Mary E. Berry, *Hideyoshi*, 233.

⁵⁰ Walter Denning, *The Life of Toyotomi Hideyoshi* (New York, AMS Press, 1930), 249.

⁵¹ Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937), 174.

⁵² Ki-baik Lee, *A new history of Korea* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984), 214.

Although Hideyoshi failed to achieve his grand dream of an Asiatic empire, there were a number of other outcomes. Korea itself was devastated, and for this the Japanese endured generations of Korean hatred. Although the Japanese didn't actually enter China their attempt did lead to the Ming being overthrown. The Japanese failed to capture any territory but there were some spoils of war. Finally Ieyasu who opposed the invasions, biding his time in Japan was able to come to power instead of Hideyoshi's son and institute his policy of peace through isolation.

“Both armies took from the Koreans whatever they could carry and burned much that was not portable, so that whole towns were lost along with some of Korea's finest buildings.”⁵³ Hideyoshi had desired that his soldiers treat the Koreans well, but as he never went to Korea himself, it was difficult to impose. The Japanese acquired a lot of knowledge from captured Koreans. They improved their naval tactics, they captured scholars who taught them Neo Confucianism, they stole the Koreans system of printing with moveable type, and kidnapped numerous skilled artisans, and laborers particularly potters. The Japanese also took more gruesome spoils of war. In 1598 over 38,000 Chinese and Korean heads were taken to Japan, where their noses and ears were cut off, pickled, and buried opposite Daibutsu temple. The mound called *Mimi-zuka* can still be seen.⁵⁴

The first invasion of Korea cost the Ming throne 10 million taels of silver, the second was just as costly to China.⁵⁵ This financial burden along with the less easy to calculate costs of defending itself and Korea from the Japanese, enabled Manchuria to break away from China proper. It has been noted that “the only real beneficiaries of the war were Nurhaci in Manchuria and Tokugawa Ieyasu, whose position within Japan was strengthened by the weakening of the daimyo of Western Japan who had invested most in supporting Hideyoshi's Korean campaign.”⁵⁶

I agree with historians that the invasions gave Hideyoshi's vast armies employment but I don't discount having read his personal letters, the part his own vanity and belief in his own destiny played in the initial invasion and the subsequent re-invasion of Korea. Although Hideyoshi was unable to achieve his

⁵³ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China Volume 8 The Ming Dynasty, 1368-144, Part 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 299.

⁵⁴ F. Hadland Davis, Japan: From the Age of the Gods to the Fall of the Tsintau (London, T.C. & E.C. Jack Ltd., 1916), 188.

⁵⁵ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China Volume 8 The Ming Dynasty, 1368-144, Part 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 72.

⁵⁶ Denis Twitchet and Frederick W. Mote eds. The Cambridge History of China, 299.

objective of a vast Asiatic empire, he did succeed in spreading his name far and wide. He also exacted a high cost from those who would refuse his benevolent rule.

The first invasion was greatly hampered by its lack of sufficient naval support. This further compounded the difficulties in maintaining lines of communication and supplies. Due to their inexperience fighting abroad and their ignorance of continental geography the Japanese, although successful in battle, eventually became overextended and unable to follow up on their advantage. Frustrated by the stalemate, the lack of supplies, and the lack of unity among daimyo's at home and abroad the first invasion was eventually called off. When the peace negotiations failed spectacularly, a second invasion was launched. Although it lacked the rapid advance of the first, it was just as successful and supported by a much more prepared navy. If the Japanese had been more committed and not withdrawn after Hideyoshi's sudden death, perhaps they would have been eventually successful.

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